#### CHAPTER SEVEN

## SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORTS

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This chapter describes the Safety Investigation Report (SIR), explains who submits the report and when, and how and why it is submitted.

## 701. GENERAL

After a mishap, use the SIR to report the hazards uncovered by the investigation. SIRs are vital to the success of the Naval Aviation Safety Program. Their succinct, open and forthright information, opinions, and recommendations help prevent the recurrence of aviation mishaps. Any attempt at command influence, any effort to edit, change, or in any way censor the content of SIRs, contradicts the spirit of the program and

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constitutes a direct violation of this instruction. All such activity is prohibited. Anyone wishing to comment on or change the contents of any SIR must do so in the open, in genser traffic, during the endorsement process.

## 702. PURPOSE OF SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORTS

SIRs report the hazards which cause mishaps and the damage or the injuries that occur during a mishap. Equally important is the opportunity they offer to submit recommendations to prevent the mishap and the damage or injury from happening again in the future.

- a. <u>Safety Investigation Report Contents</u>. An SIR has two parts.
- (1) Part A contains all MDR messages and enclosures specified in subparagraph 716c.
- (2) Part B is privileged. It consists of the complete SIR message and all enclosures required by subparagraph 716d. COMNAVSAFECEN will place the endorsements in Part B.

## 703. SUBMISSION CRITERIA

Submit SIRs for all naval aviation mishaps, except DEA Mishaps. (See appendix 5C1.)

#### 704. ORIGINATOR

The Senior Member of the AMB writes the SIR and, using the appointing authority's PLAD, releases it for comment to the endorsing chain and other interested parties. See paragraphs 206 and 605.

## 705. RISK ASSESSMENT

AMBs must assign risk assessment codes to each hazard they wish to eliminate. The RACs must correspond to the causal factors listed in paragraph 12 of the SIR. When all risks assessed in the SIR are classified as "routine," label the Safety Investigation Report "routine" as well. If any one of the risks are assessed as "severe," label it "severe." Said another way, the SIR reflects the most significant hazard reported therein. Appendix B at the end of this instruction contains information on RACs.

#### 706. DEADLINES

Submit SIRs within 30 calendar days of the mishap. If aircraft or UAVs are missing, submit the report 30 calendar days after completion of the organized search. Ask the appointing authority to request an extension from the controlling custodian if necessary. Be sure to include all appropriate addressees on the message request for an extension. Describe the specific reasons for your request; "administrative delay," or "investigative delay" are not enough. In some cases, combined calls for help and a deadline extension are appropriate. For example: when all the wreckage is not yet located, or when results of an EI, a pathological study, or a toxicology report have not yet been received. Include details on the status of any help requested in your extension request. The controlling custodian will respond via message and include the same addressees as your message requesting the extension.

## 707. METHODS OF SUBMISSION

Transmit all SIR messages via military electronic communications facilities. Mail the enclosures, with one copy of the SIR message, to the NAVSAFECEN, attention Code 15, via registered mail, return receipt requested. SIR messages and SIR enclosures are distributed differently:

## a. Safety Investigation Report Message

- (1) Address SIR messages as appendix 7A or 7B (at the end of this chapter) direct.
- (2) Only the CNO, CMC, or COMNAVSAFECEN may readdress SIR messages to organizations outside the Navy or the Marine Corps. All the above and the Controlling custodians may readdress SIRs and endorsements for further endorsement or for remedial action.
- (3) Do not distribute SIR messages to individuals or commands not specified in this instruction under any circumstances. To do so is a direct violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and subjects civilian personnel to disciplinary action under Civilian Personnel Instruction 752.
- (4) Using Standard Subject Identification Code (SSIC) 3752 on all SIR messages and endorsements helps the receiving commands limit their internal distribution to only those individuals who require the report for safety purposes.

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Commanding officers must configure their command's message distribution processor so that only authorized personnel receive the SIRs and their endorsements. Do not copy any part of an SIR without the specific approval of the commanding officer.

# b. Safety Investigation Report Package

(1) Make only two complete copies of the SIR. The AMB appointing authority keeps one and mails the other via registered mail, return receipt requested, to:

Commander, Naval Safety Center Attn: Code 15 375 A Street Norfolk, VA 23511-4399

(2) Submit three or four additional partial packages for all mishaps when an Aeromedical Analysis (AA) is prepared. Mail one copy of the SIR message, one copy of the AA and AA enclosures, and one copy of each Appendix N enclosure form to:

# Commander, Naval Safety Center

Attn: Code 14 375 A Street Norfolk, VA 23511-4399 (See paragraphs (3) and (4) below) (Enclose electronic copy of AA on disk)

## Aircraft Controlling Custodian

Attention: Command Surgeon

# OIC, Naval Aerospace Medical Institute

220 Hovey Road Pensacola, FL 32508-1047

When a fatality is involved:

## Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner

Armed Forces Institute of Pathology 1413 Research Blvd. Building 102 Rockville, MD 20850 (See paragraph (5) below)

(3) Autopsy photos, other photos of the deceased or otherwise sensitive or privileged photos shall be properly marked and sealed in a separate envelope. In addition to data

identifying the mishap (date, squadron, aircraft model, submitting Flight Surgeon's name), the envelope shall be plainly marked: "PASS DIRECTLY TO THE AEROMEDICAL DIVISION, NAVAL SAFETY CENTER". Please send only relevant photographs depicting aeromedical or physiological evidence that support findings in the AA.

- (4) Reports detailing personal or sensitive material, such as psychiatric or psychological consult reports. In a separate envelope, seal and mark these reports: "PASS DIRECTLY TO THE AEROMEDICAL DIVISION, NAVAL SAFETY CENTER". Send them to the Naval Safety Center only.
- (5) If AFIP does not have a set of these photographs (perhaps they did not visit the crash site and attend the autopsy) ensure that they receive a copy along with radiographs, radiology reports, lab reports and the coroner's report.
- (6) The Aeromedical Analysis and Safety Investigation Report contain privileged and sensitive information and shall not be sent via email over Non-Secure Internet connections.
- c. <u>Submission of Enclosures For Class C Mishaps.</u> Prepare an SIR folder with Parts A and B for all mishaps. Send only the SIR message and the AA for Class C mishaps and Appendix N forms.

## 708. PRIVILEGED INFORMATION

- a. Military and Federal courts recognize that information given under promises of confidentiality and findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the AMB and endorsers are protected from release under Executive Privilege. Promises of confidentiality are given to members of the AMB, and may be given to witnesses, although witness names are not privileged. Therefore, the deliberative analyses of findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the AMB and most witness statements are always privileged. Any information which would not have been discovered but for information provided under a promise of confidentiality is privileged. Also deemed privileged is information directly calculated by the AMB, or development of which is specifically required by the AMB, when disclosing that information would reveal the AMB's deliberative process.
- b. Data from the many various electronic recording devices now in common use is real evidence until the AMB manipulates the information into tables, multidimensional imagery or animation during the deliberation process. The product of this effort is

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analysis and, therefore, privileged information. Refer to paragraph 606d(4).

- c. Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) tapes will not be released. The Naval Safety Center may release some portions of the transcript under FOIA or Litigation but the content is subject to the Privacy Act.
- d. Photographs staged by the AMB (i.e., photographs that are preplanned or posed to illustrate a specific condition or situation) as a result of their deliberative process are privileged. All other photographs are not. However, those captions and markings placed on photographs indicative of the AMB's deliberative process are privileged. The captions and markings only, not the photographs, are privileged.
- e. COMNAVSAFECEN is authorized to determine the privileged or nonprivileged status of all information contained in the SIR.

## 709. SPECIAL HANDLING

The term "Special Handling" means the handling of privileged reports to ensure that their use is limited strictly to safety. Common sense must be applied to determine exactly what handling actions would be appropriate. For example:

- a. Uncontrolled dissemination of SIRs which could result in their disclosure to personnel not requiring knowledge of their content for safety purposes (such as placement in reading racks, on bulletin boards, etc.) would not be appropriate.
- b. On the other hand, controlled passage of SIRs from individual to individual or from office to office in file folders to ensure their disclosure to specific individuals requiring knowledge of their content for safety purposes, or a similar control method, would be appropriate.

# 710. INDEPENDENCE OF SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORTS

a. Do not append Part B of SIRs and extracts from Part B of SIRs to, or include them in, JAG Manual Investigation Reports or any other report. Do not make Navy JAG an addressee on SIR messages. Statements made to AMBs, whether or not under a promise of confidentiality, become the property of the Naval Aviation Safety Program and may not be released for inclusion in the JAG report.

- b. Part A materials, though non-privileged are also not to be provided to the JAG investigator. The JAG investigator is required to develop such evidence independently of the AMB.
- c. To preclude any inference of association with disciplinary action, JAG Manual Investigation Reports shall not be appended to, nor made a part of, any SIR. SIRs shall not include any reference to disciplinary action, Naval Aviator or Naval Flight Officer Evaluation Boards (USN), Field Flight Performance Boards (USMC), or any other administrative action in connection with the mishap being reported.

## 711. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SIRS are FOUO. See SECNAVINST 5720.42F.

## 712. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SIR messages will normally be unclassified. Omit any portion of the report that warrants classification, and substitute the word "classified." Treat enclosures in a like manner.

## 713. MESSAGE PRECEDENCE

Send all SIR messages via routine precedence.

#### 714. MINIMIZE

SIR messages are exempt from MINIMIZE. See ACP 121(d) (NOTAL) and US SUPP (B-1).

## 715. SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT MESSAGE FORMAT

- a. Format. Submit SIR messages per the following:
- (1) <u>Addressees</u>. See appendix 7A or 7B at the end of this chapter. You may only use the CAD of your type aircraft.
- (a) Repeat verbatim all material  $\underline{\text{double underlined}}$  in the format below in the text of the report.
- (b) We prescribe a single format for all SIR messages, regardless of the severity of the mishap reported, for administrative convenience, for ease of use through familiarity, and because the information required does not vary with the severity of the mishap.

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- (c) The amount of information in an SIR may vary considerably, depending on the circumstances surrounding the mishap. If a lot of information is required to explain a mishap or support the conclusions and recommendations of an AMB, an SIR might contain several pages and many enclosures. On the other hand, a simple, well defined mishap can be reported in a one or two-page SIR message.
- (d) Originator must refer to Navy Tactical Publication (NTP) 3, Telecommunications Users Manual, for the latest message format guidelines. Most of an SIR is entered in the remarks section of a GENADMIN message. Exercise care and follow all US Message Text Format (USMTF) rules.
- (2) <u>Headings</u>. Place one of the following headings at the beginning of the text:

<u>Safety Investigation Report when Reporting Custodian is AMB</u> Appointing Authority:

#### BT

<u>UNCLAS FOUO //N03752// THIS IS A LIMITED-USE, LIMITED-DISTRIBUTION, NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT</u> (-UAV for UAV mishaps only) (reporting custodian, mishap classification, mishap serial number, date of occurrence, model/series aircraft or UAV, buno)/REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3752-1

MSGID/GENADMIN/originator (reporting custodian)/message serial
number (not report serial number)/month//

#### SUBJ/AVIATION SIR//

<u>Safety Investigation Report when Reporting Custodians not AMB</u> appointing authority:

#### ВТ

UNCLAS FOUO //N03752// THIS IS A LIMITED-USE, LIMITED-DISTRIBUTION, NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT (-UAV for UAV mishaps only) (appointing authority) AMB REPORT OF (reporting custodian, mishap classification, mishap serial number, date of occurrence, model/series aircraft or UAV, buno)/REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3752-1

MSGID/GENADMIN/originator (reporting custodian)/message serial number (not report serial number)/month//

## SUBJ/AVIATION SIR//

Next, insert the references and immediately after RMKS the Limited-Use Statement:

REF/A/DOC/OPNAVINST 3750.6R/-//
REF/B/DOC JAGINST 5800.7C/-//
REF/C/(Other references as appropriate)//
NARR/REF A IS THE NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM. REF B IS THE
NAVY JAG MANUAL. REF C IS . . . .//

POC/(name of primary point of contact to answer inquiries about the SIR)/(rank)/(code)/(location)/TEL:(phone number or "deployed")/TEL:(phone number)//

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THIS IS A PRIVILEGED, LIMITED-USE, LIMITED-DISTRIBUTION, SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT. UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT OR ITS SUPPORTING ENCLOSURES BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE PUNISHABLE UNDER ARTICLE 92, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE. UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT OR ITS SUPPORTING ENCLOSURES BY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WILL SUBJECT THEM TO DISCIPLINARY ACTION PURSUANT TO CIVILIAN PERSONNEL INSTRUCTION 752. THIS REPORT MAY NOT BE RELEASED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, EXCEPT BY THE COMMANDER NAVAL SAFETY CENTER.

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1. MISHAP INFO:

Remainder of the Text:

- A. THIS REPORT CONCERNS A (routine or severe) HAZARD TO NAVAL AVIATION. If the criteria in paragraph 804 requires endorsement of the report include the following phrase: (state first endorser) ENDORSEMENT REQUESTED IAW REF (A). SUMMARY: Summarize the content of the report and provide a brief description of the mishap, such as crashed into the water, gear-up landing, midair collision, ran off runway, settled into water after cat shot; etc. Do not disclose potential causal factors.
- B. PRIVILEGED MISHAP NARRATIVE Prepare a narrative that reports, in detail, the events leading up to the mishap, the sequence of events during the mishap, the causes of the mishap and why the mishap occurred. Write this narrative for those outside the endorsing chain so they may quickly understand what happened and the lessons learned. The endorsers will want to

read the SIR in full to be sure the investigation and the report are complete and withstand scrutiny.

This paragraph shall contain a concise narrative of the mishap developed from the accepted causal factors in paragraph 11. Base this narrative on the accepted analysis in paragraph 11. Include all causal factors of the mishap and causal factors of other damage or injury. If the AMB wants to include further explanation, conjecture or theory in the narrative, they must first introduce and analyze this new information as a new causal factor in paragraph 11. Do not include new causal factors in the narrative that cannot be accepted in paragraph 11.

c. Paragraphs 2 through 9: Repeat MDR paragraphs 2 through 9. Include any new nonprivileged information that has not been provided in previous MDRs.

## 10. EVIDENCE

- A. ENCLOSURES HAVE BEEN MAILED PER REF A. (Mail a complete set of enclosures for Class A and B mishaps only. Mail only the AA for Class C mishaps. The appointing authority holds copies of all enclosures.)
- $\underline{\text{(1A)}}$  Copy of initial MDR message. This is always the first non-privileged enclosure.
  - (2A) SIR ENCLOSURE FORMS (appendix N, as required).
    - (A) FORM 1
    - (B) FORM 2 (MP) (MCP) (MCC) (etc.)
    - (C) FORM 3 (MP) (MCP) (MCC) (etc.)
- (D) Continue listing of all other forms as required by appendix  ${\tt N}$ .
- $\underline{\text{(3A)}}$  List of witnesses whose statements were used as evidence who were not given a promise of confidentiality. If all witnesses were given a promise of confidentiality, state, "None."
  - (4A) Subsequent nonprivileged enclosures as appropriate.
- $\underline{\text{(1B)}}$  Copy of SIR message. This is always the first privileged enclosure.

(2B) Second privileged enclosure.

(3B) Etc.

## B. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

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 $\underline{(A)}$  First acronym, or abbreviation, or definition defined.

 $\underline{\mbox{(B)}}$  Second acronym, or abbreviation, or definition defined.

<u>(C)</u> Etc.

- $\underline{(2)}$  First item of evidence. (2A). (This item, as shown in this example, is nonprivileged from one of the forms in enclosure (2A).)
- (P) $\underline{(3)}$  Second item of evidence. (3B). (This item, as shown in this example, is privileged from enclosure (3B).)

<u>(4)</u> Etc.

List the enclosures to the SIR in subparagraph "A" indicating those that are nonprivileged beginning with "(1A)"; and those that are privileged, with "(1B)" as shown. These correspond to the "A" and "B" sides of the SIR package. Enclosure (1A) shall be copies of all MDR messages. Enclosure (1B) shall be a copy of the SIR message. Make data such as transcripts, aircraft discrepancies, etc., enclosures only if critical to understanding this mishap. List all enclosures, privileged or not, in paragraph 10A. Then, list the evidence considered by the AMB in paragraph 10B, Summary of Evidence. Recommend a chronological sequence. It enhances clarity. But the AMB may list the evidence in whatever manner they desire. The idea is to communicate effectively with the reader; to present the information clearly and distinctly. Compile this listing of factual evidence without regard to the source. It must include all the evidence which forms the basis for the analysis in paragraph 11 and ultimately the recommended corrective action in paragraph 12. The Summary of Evidence list will ordinarily contain privileged information. Since privileged information obtained by the AMB from witness statements (oral or written),

or speculations about the evidence made by the AMB, may not be released, you must identify all such privileged evidence with the letter "P" in parenthesis: (P) at the beginning of each privileged fact listed. Use (P) to indicate privileged information. Do not use the symbol (P) when citing information taken from unprivileged witness statements. Use (NP) in those cases. Discuss data of a personal nature only in general terms in this paragraph. Include any details in the AA. Refer to enclosures and information in enclosures by identifying them as: (2A), (3B), etc. Keep this information detailed, but concise. A lengthy SIR message is neither desired nor warranted. Do not include conclusions or recommendations in this paragraph.

#### 11. ANALYSIS

A. (Insert appropriate term) FACTOR - (Describe causal factor in terse sentence or phrase.) Causal factors are specific acts of omission or commission. Thus, the hazard statement must contain a "WHO"/"WHAT" or "COMPONENT"/ "MODE" combination. ACCEPTED or REJECTED. Select appropriate term, based on your opinion of whether statement is true. AMB analysis of the causal factor follows. The analysis must specifically state how the causal factor caused the mishap and must clearly detail all the "WHYs" or "AGENTS" which gave rise to a particular causal factor. These "WHYs" or "AGENTS" may also be developed into separate causal factors, if need be. If the causal factor is accepted, include the following phrase: BASED ON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS, THE AMB CONCLUDES (make a concise restatement of the accepted causal factor stating who did what and why, or what part failed, how it failed and why. There can be multiple WHYs/AGENTs. For each accepted causal factor, add causal factor elements (WHO/WHAT/WHY or COMP/MODE/AGENT) as described in subparagraph 607d and appendix L at the end of the paragraph.)

WHO: or COMP: (List who or component element.)
WHAT: or MODE: (List what or mode element
WHY: or AGENT: (List why or agent element.)

(Below is an example showing an aircrew factor which is accepted. For each accepted causal factor there is only one WHO and one WHAT, however, there may be more than one WHY. If there is more than one logical WHO/WHAT combination, find and describe another causal factor. See Subparagraph 607d. Additional causal factor examples are contained in appendix M.)

B. AIRCREW FACTOR - PILOT AT CONTROLS FAILED TO LOWER THE LANDING GEAR. ACCEPTED. E.I. REVEALED LANDING GEAR SYSTEM WAS FULLY OPERATIONAL AT THE TIME OF THE MISHAP. POST-MISHAP PHOTOGRAPHS INDICATE THE LANDING GEAR HANDLE WAS UP. MISHAP PILOT HAD ONLY FOUR HOURS SLEEP PRIOR TO THE FLIGHT. HE STATED A RADIO CALL INTERRUPTED HIS LANDING CHECKS, BUT HE THOUGHT HE LOWERED THE GEAR. BASED ON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS THE AMB CONCLUDES THE MISHAP PILOT FAILED TO LOWER THE LANDING GEAR BECAUSE HE LACKED ADEQUATE REST AND WAS DISTRACTED BY THE RADIO CALL.

WHO: AIRCREW, PILOT AT CONTROLS, AIRCRAFT COMMANDER.

<u>WHAT:</u> AIRCREW, DID NOT EXTEND LANDING GEAR, FAILED TO CONFIRM LANDING GEAR POSITION PRIOR TO LANDING.

<u>WHY</u>: PHYSIOLOGICAL, ACUTE EFFECTS, FATIGUE, INADEQUATE REST. WHY: PERFORMANCE, FAILURE OF ATTENTION, DISTRACTION EXTERNAL.

Causal factors shall contain the AMB's analysis of only that evidence discussed in paragraph 10 in the format shown. The first statement of each causal factor shall be the selected type of factor that fits the theory being tested; that is: AIRCREW, SUPERVISORY, FACILITIES PERSONNEL, MAINTENANCE, or MATERIAL FACTOR. Follow the selected factor by a dash, then a short sentence or phrase that describes what happened, the specific act of omission or commission, then either the statement "ACCEPTED" or "REJECTED." Your analysis of this hazard must support its acceptance as a causal factor. Next comes the explanation of why this causal factor is accepted or rejected and how it influenced the mishap. Your analysis must be sufficient to describe the deliberations of the AMB, including those aeromedical conditions existing at the time of the mishap. It must state the basis for acceptance or rejection of every theory. Describe the details of this deductive reasoning process sufficiently enough for later endorser of the report to judge fairly the validity of the conclusions you reached. For each causal factor be sure you construct a "word picture" from the evidence and AMB speculation that will provide the reader with a clear idea of what the board thinks happened. If you are describing a human act of omission or commission explain the billet "who" (the position, not the name), "what" the "who" did, and "why." If you are explaining a material factor you must specifically define a particular part, its failure "mode" and the technical "agent(s)" which caused that component to fail. You may develop the "why(s)" or "agent(s)" of a specific causal factor into separate causal factors if need be. Your analysis must also explain how this particular causal factor influenced the mishap. If your causal factor is accepted, conclude with the statement: "BASED ON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS, THE AMB CONCLUDES (state "WHO" or "COMPONENT" - same as the hazard statement, then state, "WHAT" or failure "MODE" from hazard statement) BECAUSE. From above analysis, state the "WHY(S)" or "AGENT(S)") which caused the specific act of omission or commission. All accepted causal factors must include causal factor elements:

WHO/WHAT/WHY or COMPONENT/MODE/ AGENT. Select elements of human causal factors from the lists in appendix L. Describe material causal factors in plain language using standard nomenclature, as explained in subparagraph 607d(1)(b). To enhance readability, begin each element on a new line and indent it. The requirement for this dual statement of accepted causal factors is driven by the AMB's desire to describe its analysis in its own language, and the peculiarities of COMNAVSAFECEN's primary analytical tool, the Safety Information Management System.

C. Subsequent factors determined by AMB from the evidence. This paragraph shall contain the AMB's analysis of only that evidence discussed in paragraph 10 in the format shown. The first statement of each analyzed item shall be the factor that fits the hypothesis under scrutiny; that is: AIRCREW, SUPERVISORY, FACILITIES PERSONNEL, MAINTENANCE, or MATERIAL FACTOR. Follow the selected factor with a dash, then a short sentence or phrase that describes what happened (the special act of omission or commission), then either the statement "ACCEPTED" or "REJECTED." The explanation of why you accepted or rejected this theory follows this. Be sure your explanation is detailed enough to describe how the AMB deliberated over each hypothesis, including those aeromedical conditions existing at the time of the mishap. This explanation must also describe why each theory was accepted or rejected. Include enough detail so that subsequent endorsers may fairly judge your reasoning process. State the basis for rejection or acceptance of each idea proffered. It helps to discuss events and possible causal factors in chronological sequence. If the causal factor is accepted, state: "BASED ON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS, THE AMB CONCLUDES THAT (Make a concise restatement of the accepted causal factor stating WHO did WHAT and WHY, or what component failed, how it failed and why)." All accepted causal factors must include causal factor elements. The parts of each WHO/WHAT/WHY or COMPONENT/MODE/AGENT are termed the causal factor elements. Select the elements of human causal factors from the lists in appendix L. Describe the elements of material causal factors in plain language, using standard nomenclature, as explained in subparagraph 607d1(b). To enhance readability, begin on a new line and indent each element. Those causal factors that are accepted in paragraph 11 must also appear in the paragraph 1b narrative, and in the appropriate causal factors of the mishap or causal factors causing other damage or

injury subparagraph. Exercise care to keep emotions out of this and all other sections of the SIR.

#### 12. CONCLUSIONS

## A. CAUSAL FACTORS OF THE MISHAP:

 $\underline{(1)}$  (Select one of the following determination statements according to the degree to which the causal factors are determined:)

THE CAUSAL FACTOR(S) OF THIS MISHAP IS (ARE):

THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSAL FACTOR(S) OF THIS MISHAP IS (ARE):

THE CAUSAL FACTOR(S) OF THIS MISHAP IS (ARE)
UNDETERMINED WITH THE FOLLOWING POSSIBLE CAUSAL FACTOR(S):

THE CAUSAL FACTOR OF THIS MISHAP IS DETERMINED TO BE: NO FAULT ASSIGNED. THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL FACTOR(S) IS (ARE) ASSIGNED: (Then, list each accepted causal factor in the analysis. See subparagraph 607d(2)(a)2.)

- (B) AIRCREW FACTOR PILOT AT CONTROLS FAILED TO LOWER THE LANDING GEAR BECAUSE HE WAS FATIGUED. RAC 3. (This hypothetical example shows the conclusions relating to the example factor in paragraph 11 above.) ASSOCIATED RECOMMENDATIONS: 13.A.(1)(a), 13.A.(4)(3).
- $\underline{\text{(C)}}$  (Subsequent conclusions as determined by the AMB.)
- B. CAUSAL FACTORS CAUSING OTHER DAMAGE AND INJURY:

  (Include this section if there is "other damage or injury."

  Begin with appropriate determination statement substituting

  "OTHER DAMAGE OR INJURY" for "THIS MISHAP." If no "other damage or injury" then state "NONE.".

 $\underline{(1)}$  (Include causal factors relating to "other damage or injury" in this paragraph in same format as mishap causal factor.)

Separate the AMB's conclusions into two groups: causal factors "CAUSING THE MISHAP," and causal factors causing "OTHER DAMAGE or INJURY" as shown. The plain language conclusions of the AMB are the causal factors and appear in the subparagraphs of each section. Preceding them is the determination statement, selected according to the degree of mishap determination from among the five choices listed. Following each causal factor is the RAC as determined by the AMB. Begin the description of each causal factor with the identification of the classification of the type of factor, that is, AIRCREW FACTOR, followed by a short sentence or phrase describing who did what and why in plain language - ending with the RAC. To repeat the analysis paragraph for the factor up to where the factor is accepted, followed by the RAC is both sufficient and appropriate. All factors that are accepted in the analysis section must appear in the Conclusions section. Except as noted in paragraph 12.C., do not report hazards in the SIR that are not accepted as factors. Send a separate Hazard Report in such cases. Note that including a hazard in the paragraph 12.C. ORM analysis will not obligate any activity to take action; if a hazard is discovered which is unrelated to the causal factors and action to correct the hazard is desired, a Hazard Report is the proper venue to initiate such action.

## C. OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT:

Purpose. This paragraph shall contain a general summary of significant hazards associated with the mishap together with existing or recommended risk management actions for eliminating or controlling these hazards. Operational Risk Management (ORM) is a five step process for dealing with risk associated with naval operations which involves hazard identification, risk assessment, risk decision making, implementation of effective risk controls, and supervision. The proper application of ORM optimizes operational capability and readiness by managing risk to accomplish the mission with minimal loss or damage. thus an effective tool that also supports the Naval Aviation Safety Program objectives to preserve human and material resources. The information requested in this paragraph is part of an initial ORM data collection effort by the Naval Safety Center. The long-term goal of collecting this data is to provide a valuable reference database of known naval aviation

operations hazards and available risk control measures that can be employed to eliminate or minimize the probability and/or severity of loss or damage.

General Guidelines. The basic intent of this paragraph is to list the most significant hazards associated with the assigned mission and the existing or recommended risk control measures to eliminate or mitigate that risk. For the purposes of this stage of development of the ORM database, it is left to the AMB's judgement on what to list here as the most significant hazards. In reality every mission has a wide variety of attendant hazards, some which are unique due to the tasking (i.e. terrain avoidance on a low level navigation flight, formation flight midair collision, etc.) and some which may be common to many missions (i.e. aircrew fatigue or proficiency level, flying in IMC, etc.). It is not necessary to attempt to list every conceivable hazard that exists in this paragraph. Rather AMB's should apply a "reasonable man" approach and focus this paragraph on those hazards that would be considered the most significant to address from a preflight planning and operations management perspective.

Although the basic information contained in this paragraph may seem very similar to that contained in other paragraphs in the SIR, several differences exist in the format in order to support the initial ORM database collection effort. A natural starting point for listing the hazards and associated control measures would be to consider the identified causal factors and recommendations in paragraphs 12A-B and 13. First it will be necessary for the AMB to rephrase these casual factors as described in the format paragraph below. Secondly, in some cases it may be possible to combine similar separate casual factors into a single hazard (i.e. separate aircrew factors for the pilot and copilot due to fatigue may be simply listed as a single hazard under aircrew fatigue). Finally, this paragraph differs from others in that the hazards listed here are not restricted to those identified as casual factors. course of the investigation the AMB identifies a significant hazard that was not a causal factor in this mishap but had the potential to result in significant damage or loss, it should be listed here. This will support the intent of building a meaningful reference database for subsequent users in applying their risk management process.

For each hazard listed, the AMB should list at least one existing risk control or a recommendation to either modify existing risk controls or implement additional ones.

- Format. (Submit the ORM assessment using the following format for each hazard listed. A hazard is defined as any potential cause of damage, injury, or loss. A control is a measure which eliminates the hazard or reduces the probability and/or severity of damage, injury, or loss.)

- $\underline{\text{(2) HAZARD} \ -}$  (Subsequently list additional hazards as deemed appropriate.)
- $\underline{\text{(A) CONTROL -}}$  (List a short 1-4 line narrative description of the control.)
- (B) CONTROL (List other controls as applicable. There can easily be multiple controls listed for each hazard.)

(Below is an example of several hazards and their associated controls. For existing controls which are not directed Navywide such as through an OPNAVINST or a NATOPS manual, cite the local reference and summarize the provisions of the control.)

## (1) HAZARD - Aircrew Fatigue

- $\underline{\mbox{(A)}}$  CONTROL Comply with OPNAVINST 3710.7R Rest and sleep requirements.
- (SOP) requiring aircrew to notify squadron Operations Officer of extenuating circumstances precluding sufficient crew rest prior to scheduled flights.
  - (2) HAZARD Failure of newly replaced tail rotor blade
- (A) CONTROL Squadron QA validate currency and accuracy of NAVAIR XX-XXX.XX-XX tail rotor blade maintenance manuals and XX-XX NATOPS Manual.
  - (B) CONTROL Comply with NAVAIR XX-XXX.XX-XX

maintenance procedures for tail rotor blade replacement.

- (C) CONTROL Comply with XX NATOPS Functional Checkflight procedures for tail rotor blade maintenance.
- 13. RECOMMENDATIONS. The format for the Recommendations paragraph is similar to the Conclusions paragraph and separated into the same two groups identified in paragraph 12. Do not include recommendations which do not eliminate hazards identified in paragraph 12 in the SIR. On the contrary, all CAUSAL FACTORS (Hazards) identified in paragraph 12 must have some recommendation for remedial action in paragraph 13. The AMB should test their corrective actions as they develop them to be sure they address the WHYs of each CAUSAL FACTOR. Appendix M contains an example for completing paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13.

## 716. ENCLOSURES TO THE SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT

a. <u>Purpose</u>. SIR enclosures serve two purposes. One is to provide additional data on the mishap that can be coded and entered in the NAVSAFECEN data bank and used as research material. The other is to clarify points of evidence too voluminous for the SIR message body. The AMB must collect the evidence, deliberate, and come to conclusions. It is not necessary to substantiate evidence provided in the SIR message other than to cite its source. The SIR is not a legal document. Its adequacy has nothing to do with the size of the folder. The appointing authority must hold the information collected during the investigation until the final endorsement. Enclosures in Part A will only contain nonprivileged information. Paragraph 708 highlights the distinctions between privileged and non-privileged information.

## b. Method of Submission

## (1) Assembly

- (a)  $\underline{\text{Part A}}$  of the SIR will include a copy of all MDR messages and Part A enclosures (refer to subparagraph 716c). Attach them to the left side of the folder.
- (b) Part B of the SIR will include a copy of the SIR message and Part B enclosures (refer to subparagraph 716d). Attach them to the right side of the folder.

## (2) Marking

- (a) Mark the edge of the file folder and the backside of all Part A photographs:
- $\underline{1}.$  If reporting custodian is the appointing authority of the AMB: "REPORTING CUSTODIAN, MISHAP CLASSIFICATION, MISHAP SERIAL NUMBER ."
- $\underline{2}.$  If the appointing authority of the AMB is not the reporting custodian: (APPOINTING AUTHORITY) "  $\underline{AMB}$  REPORT  $\underline{OF}$  " REPORTING CUSTODIAN, MISHAP CLASSIFICATION, MISHAP SERIAL NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_.
- (b) Mark Part B of the file folder, each enclosure, and the reverse of all Part B photographs: "THIS IS A PART OF A LIMITED-USE NAVAL AVIATION (or UAV) SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT LIMITED-DISTRIBUTION AND SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED BY OPNAVINST 3750.6R".
- c. <u>Submission Criteria for Part A (Nonprivileged)</u>
  <u>Enclosures</u>. Part A enclosures to the SIR may include, when appropriate or when required below,
- (1) A copy of all MDR messages. (This is always enclosure (1).)
- (2) SIR Enclosure Forms (appendix N) As Appropriate: (This is always enclosure (2).)
- (a) SIR Form 1, <u>General Information Data</u>. Submit this form on all mishaps.
- (b) SIR Form 2, <u>Individual Background Data</u>. Submit this form for each aircrew member. Also submit this form for any other person who may have contributed to the mishap.
- (c) SIR Form 3, <u>Medical Information</u>. Submit this form for everyone injured or having a relevant medical finding.
- (d) SIR Form 4, Aviation Physiology, Egress and Water Survival Training Data. Submit this form for each person involved in the mishap who has received or should have received training in physiology, egress, or water survival, when that training, or lack of, was a factor in the mishap or damage or injury associated with the mishap.

- (e) SIR Form 5, <u>Aviation Life Support Systems Data</u>. Submit this form for each person who was the subject of an escape, survival or rescue episode. Also submit this form for each person who used or tried to use survival or escape equipment or clothing.
- (f) SIR Form 6, <u>Escape</u>, <u>Egress Data</u>. Submit this form for each person who ejected, bailed out, or otherwise made an emergency or unintentional egress.
- (g) SIR Form 7, <u>Ejection or Bailout Data</u>. Submit this form for anyone who ejected, tried to eject, or bailed out. Also submit this form if the canopy is jettisoned for any reason.
- (h) SIR Form 8, <u>Survival and Rescue Data</u>. Submit on anyone rescued by a Search and Rescue (SAR) effort. Submit one for an unsuccessful SAR effort.
- (i) SIR Form 9, <u>Aircrew Data</u>. Submit this form for all mishaps that involve aircrew.
- (j) SIR Form 10, <u>Aircraft Data</u>. Submit this form for all mishaps involving maintenance or material.
- (k) SIR Form 11, <u>Crash Data</u>. Submit this form for all mishaps involving manned aircraft colliding with the ground, water, or other aircraft.
- (1) SIR Form 12, <u>Night Vision Device Data</u> Submit this form for all mishaps in which NVDs played a part.
- (m) SIR Form 13,  $\underline{\text{Meteorological Data}}$ . Submit this form for all flight mishaps and any other mishaps with weather involvement.
- (3) <u>Copies of NATOPS Qualification Jacket Page</u>: Submit these forms for the cockpit crews on all Class A and B flight mishaps and flight-related mishaps where there is aircrew involvement, ejection, bailout or emergency egress:
  - (a) Mission Qualification Record
  - (b) School/Course Attendance Record
- (c) Operational Physiology and Survival Training Record

- (d) Designation Record
- (e) Mishap/Flight Violation Record
- (4) <u>Photographic Coverage</u>. Photographs are helpful in analyzing the mishap. Most mishap photographs, except for those contained in the AA, autopsy report, and those staged by the AMB, are factual and nonprivileged (see subparagraph 708c). After removing any privileged captions or markings, place a copy of all nonprivileged photographs in Part A. See paragraphs 716d(3)(b) for AA and autopsy photographs and 716d(2) for information on other Part B photographs.
- (5) <u>Sketches and Diagrams</u>. Submit only if needed to clarify events which are difficult to explain in the text of the report. Never include information from sources who have been promised confidentiality, or anything which would expose the deliberative process of the AMB. That information resides only in Part B. (See paragraph 708.)
- (6) Engineering Investigation. EIs, technical, laboratory and contractor reports must contain only factual information. Speculation, opinions and mishap casual factors have no place in these evaluations. If the AMB desires information that requires speculation or opinion from an expert, it should extend a promise of confidentiality to that individual and indicate they will consider it in their deliberations. If the AMB promises confidentiality to experts, they must separate the information these experts provide from the factual evidence and submit it as a privileged witness statement under Part B.
- (7) <u>Data Recorders</u>. The information in Flight Data Recorders (FDRs), flight incident recorders (FIR), cockpit voice recorders (CVR), video tape recorders and mission computers recovered from mishap aircraft are invaluable to the AMB's analysis. Properly preserving and transporting these "black boxes" directly effects the success of data retrieval.
- $\mbox{\ \ (a)}$  Never open or tamper with any recording or memory device.
- (b) For any data recorders, Heads Up Display (HUD) recorders contaminated by water, fuel, hydraulic fluid, foam, etc., soak and rinse them in ionized or distilled water to flush any sources of corrosion. Keep them immersed until sealed in an air-tight container for shipping/transport.

- (c) For those devices employing non-volatile memory or memory "chips", use static-free caps on electrical hookup ports, and wrap the device in EMI/static shield (Mil-B-81705C Type I Class I or equivalent) before wrapping it in bubble wrap. Take special care to protect any device which employs solid-state circuitry from exposure to static electricity. Ship listing the squadron, type aircraft, bureau number, and date of mishap. Also attach (in a waterproof bag) a copy of the latest MDR about the mishap.
- (d) Place the FIR in a sturdy shipping container and cushion with bubble wrap or other energy-absorbing material. Firmly attach a label or tag to the FIR listing the squadron, type aircraft, bureau number, and date of mishap. Attach, in a waterproof bag, a copy of the latest MDR about the mishap.
- (e) Mail via fastest traceable means available or send with a courier service if available.
- (f) Clearly mark the outside of the package: "DO NOT X-RAY" and "Aviation Mishap INVESTIGATION EVIDENCE, DO NOT TAMPER WITH CONTENTS." For ASH-20 FIRs only, mark the package: "CONTAINS MAGNETIC TAPE, DO NOT X-RAY" and "Aviation Mishap INVESTIGATION EVIDENCE, DO NOT TAMPER WITH CONTENTS."
  - (q) For FIRs, ship immediately to:

Commander, Naval Safety Center Attn: Code 13 375 A Street Norfolk VA 23511-4399

Send message to COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA indicating the date, mode of shipment, shipping document number, and estimated date of arrival. Info COMNAVAIRSYSCOM WASHINGTON DC.

- (h) For <u>other</u> models of FIRs, contact COMNAVSAFECEN Aircraft Mishap Investigation Division concerning shipping instructions. (See appendix D.)
- (8) <u>Autopsy Protocol Reports</u>. Include laboratory and x-ray reports, if applicable.
- (9) Other Nonprivileged Enclosures as Defined in Paragraph 708

- d. <u>Submission Criteria for Part B (PRIVILEGED DATA)</u>
  <u>Enclosures</u>. Include Part B enclosures to the SIR when appropriate, or as required below:
- (1) A copy of the SIR message. (This is always enclosure (1).)
- (2) Photographic Coverage. Submit a copy of any privileged photographs selected for submission in the SIR, except autopsy photographs (refer to subparagraph 716d(3)(b) $\underline{5}$ ), in this enclosure. Label all photographs included in Part B with captions and any other markings necessary to ensure clarity.

## (3) Aeromedical Analysis (AA)

- (a) <u>Submission Criteria.</u> If contributing human factors are suspected, there are personnel injuries, or pertinent medical findings, or there are attempts to eject, bail out, or otherwise emergency egress, submit an AA.
- 1. The AA is the privileged report by the AMB flight surgeon that addresses mishap causes, conclusions and recommendations. As an enclosure to the SIR, the AA documents the aeromedical conditions the flight surgeon has determined to be pertinent to the mishap. These conditions include all human factors contributing to the mishap, injury, or other damage. It shall include all aircrew, maintenance, facilities, and supervisory factors. Any aeromedical causal factor discovered during the investigation must be brought to the attention of the AMB and addressed in the SIR message. However, there is no guarantee they will accept it as a causal factor. There may be aeromedical conditions present, which did not contribute to the mishap. List these in the designated subsection of the AA's conclusions. The AA and other portions of the SIR are complementary and expected to overlap. The format for the AA should follow the outline below with double underlined material repeated verbatim:
- 1. Review of Events. This section of the AA is a chronological review of the mishap beginning with any preexisting aeromedical conditions and closing with the survivors coming under appropriate medical care. It should stand on its own merit. The reader should be able to understand the discussion section without referring to the SIR message or other documents. This section should include a brief medical and psychological profile of everyone involved. The flight surgeon will review sensitive,

personal or speculative topics as pertinent in this section and comment on these additional areas for each person involved in the mishap:

- 72-hour history
- physiology training
- flight physical
- physical qualification waivers
- life stressors
- relationships with co-workers, family and friends
- acute medical problems
- chronic medical problems
- current medication use
- post-mishap biological samples/results
- autopsy and post-mortem lab studies
- escape or egress/survival episodes
- SAR effort
- treatment and transport of those injured.
- 2. Discussion and Conclusions (HFACS Analysis). In this section Flight Surgeons shall list all the aeromedical conditions that were accepted by the AMB as a "what" or "why" using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). List all of the aeromedical conditions that were causal factors in the mishap in subsection 2a. List all aeromedical conditions that were causal factors of additional damage or injury in subsection 2b. In subsection 2c, list all of the aeromedical conditions that were present but did not contribute to either the mishap or additional damage or injury. See appendix J. Appendix O contains an HFACS primer. Note that the official causal factors of the mishap are defined by the detailed cause factors (who/what/why's); HFACS are general categories of causal factors and, just as with narrative cause factors, are assigned purely to facilitate mishap analysis.
- 3. Aeromedical Recommendations. This section is similar to paragraph 13 of the SIR. Based on aeromedical conclusions, make your recommendations here to prevent accepted causal factors from recurring and to prevent or limit the severity of additional damage or injury. Key each recommendation to the appropriate conclusion, and address them to the most appropriate action agency for change. Like SIR recommendations, aeromedical recommendations should be specific and definitive.
- (b) <u>Enclosures to the AA.</u> Hold supporting documents to a minimum, but include the following enclosures if pertinent:

- $\underline{1}$ . You must include chronological account of activities for the past 72 hours on everyone involved.
- $\underline{2}$ . Any medical record extracts you need to clarify or support the AA.
- $\underline{3}$ . The AFIP aircraft mishap reconstruction by evaluation of injury patterns report.
- $\underline{4}$ . Reports detailing personal or sensitive material, such as psychiatric or psychological consult reports. In a separate envelope, seal and mark these reports: "PASS DIRECTLY TO THE AEROMEDICAL DIVISION, NAVAL SAFETY CENTER. Send them to the Naval Safety Center and nowhere else.
- $\underline{5}$ . Sensitive photographs, such as autopsy photographs or other photographs of the deceased. In a separate envelope, seal and mark these photographs: "PASS DIRECTLY TO THE AEROMEDICAL DIVISION, NAVAL SAFETY CENTER. Send them to the Naval Safety Center and nowhere else.
- $\underline{6}$ . Include any other documents that meet the criteria for privilege (see paragraph 708), that will clarify or support the AA.

NOTE: Keep any nonprivileged supporting documentation (such as radiology slips) on the nonprivileged side of the SIR. Do not duplicate enclosures held in the main body of the report.

- (c) <u>No AA Required</u>. When the nature of the mishap does not meet submission criteria described above for an AA, include a statement to that affect, along with an explanation for your conclusion in paragraph 6 of the initial MDR message. (See paragraph 514.)
- (4) <u>Witness Statements</u>. Submit witness statements only if the content is critical to understanding the report. Transcribe telephone conversations in the form of a "results of interview" and submit them as witness statements. Do not send lengthy transcripts or tapes. You may include a summary of interviews in the SIR message.
- (a) <u>Aircrew Statements</u>. If possible, enclose a statement made by everyone who ejected, bailed out, made an emergency egress, or was rescued in a SAR operation. Their statements should recount all problems they encountered before or during egress from the aircraft, during parachute descent and

landing, and during survival and rescue episodes. Include any information on the use and the effectiveness or any problems with survival and signaling equipment. A promise of confidentiality for such witnesses is not usual but may be granted if necessary to elicit testimony.

- (b) <u>LSO/LSE/Taxi Director Statements</u>. You may use summarized statements from the controlling LSO, the senior LSO present, LSO, LSE, and the taxi director whenever mishaps occur to aircraft under their control. Those should include the following information, if appropriate:
- $\underline{\mathbf{1}}$ . A complete account of the mishap from their viewpoints.
- $\underline{2}$ . An analysis of the pilot's landing grades for the previous 30 days (use OPNAV 3760/71 Form).
- $\underline{\mathbf{3}}$ . Applicable items requested by section VII of the LSO NATOPS Manual.
- (c) Other Statements (Specify). Include statements from the SAR pilots, SAR swimmers, or others involved in the rescue, only if their statements clarify ones understanding of the rescue. Promise confidentiality if necessary to elicit testimony.
- (5) AMB-Developed Information. Whenever the AMB directly calculates or specifically requires the development of detailed information during its deliberations, that information and the deliberative process surrounding it is privileged. Include it in Part B only. The above guidelines specifically apply to the following types of data often included in the SIR:
- (a) Arresting/Catapult Data. Submit, in Part A or Part B or both as described above, in every mishap where the arresting gear, launching system, optical landing system, or arresting gear/catapult crew malfunctioned. Include as much technical information concerning failure, malfunction, or inadequacy as necessary to identify the difficulty completely.
- (b) <u>Takeoff Data</u>. If takeoff data calculation was a possible causal factor, enclose a copy of the data calculated before the mishap (if available) in Part A, and a copy of takeoff data calculated by the AMB in Part B only.

- (c) <u>Weight and Balance</u>. Submit weight and balance information gathered directly under a specific AMB ordered test in part B only, even if a DD 365F prepared before the mishap was submitted in Part A.
- (d) <u>Electronic Information</u>. Summarize all electronic information, such as National Track Analysis Program (NTAP), Air Combat Maneuvering Range (ACMR) tapes, and other process electronic data available before the in the SIR message, if necessary. Send any additional electronic information specifically developed by or for the AMB in Part B only.
- (e) Flight Incident Recorders. Information developed from the raw data contained in flight incident recorders or other data sources, and subjected to AMB analysis, is privileged. Place it in Part B if included in the report. Place data points taken from the raw data such as airspeed or flap position in Part A, if required.
- (f) Other (Describe). Include any other information obtained under a promise of confidentiality, or specifically developed by or for the AMB, which would be helpful in understanding the report itself and cannot be summarized in part B.

# 717. PLAT (PILOT LANDING AID TELEVISION) TAPE FORWARDING DOCUMENT.

Handle PLAT tapes as follows:

- a. Classify all recorded PLAT/integrated launch and recovery television surveillance system (ILARTS) tapes CONFIDENTIAL. Classify them SECRET if they reveal a serious deficiency in aircraft or carrier operations which would degrade ability of the fleet to perform its mission. Classify them per OPNAVINST C5513.2B, enclosure 105, (NOTAL) directs. CNO (N78F) will eventually review them for declassification.
- b. After review by the AMB, forward copies of the tape to the Officer in Charge, Landing Signal Officer School, NAS Oceana, Virginia Beach, VA 23460-5129, to COMNAVSAFECEN (Attn: Code 10), and to the controlling custodian. These commands will make the tape available for review by the SIR endorsers.
- c. The forwarding document for the PLAT/ILARTS tapes shall include reporting custodian, mishap serial number, DTG (local) of the mishap, model aircraft, bureau number, and a brief

description of the mishap. Include a copy of the forwarding document as an enclosure in part A of the SIR.

## 718. AVIATION MISHAP BOARD REVIEW OF SIRS

Regardless of the degree of a member's active participation in an investigation, each AMB member shall review the completed report before its release. The AMB arrives at its conclusions by consensus with no one member having veto power over the conclusions of the board. AMB members shall not keep a personal copy of the SIR.

## 719. APPOINTING AUTHORITY REVIEW OF SIRS

- a. It is the AMB senior member's responsibility to prepare a complete SIR of high quality. To ensure the integrity and independence of the AMB and to prevent any hint of command influence, prebriefing, or reviewing its contents of the AMB's report with any endorsers prior to releasing the SIR message is absolutely prohibited.
- b. Appointing authorities of Class B and C AMBs may review SIRs for completeness (as opposed to review for concurrence or nonconcurrence) prior to the release of the SIR message and mailing of the enclosures. Should the appointing authority consider the investigation or report incomplete, he/she should send the report back to the AMB along with sufficient direction to ensure an acceptable.